GAY RIGHTS
The
judicial imposition of "gay" rights
by Rory Leishman
Forty
years ago, buggery was a criminal code offence in Canada, carrying a maximum
penalty upon conviction of 14 years in prison. Today, there is no such provision
in the criminal code. The law has been so completely transformed that anyone who
still insists in public that anal intercourse is a sinful and dangerous
perversion, especially in the midst of an AIDS epidemic, could end up in jail as
a prisoner of conscience. What has gone wrong? What accounts for this sudden,
drastic and reckless revolution in the law?
Former
prime minister Pierre Trudeau bears much of the responsibility. As justice
minister in 1967, he introduced one of the worst pieces of legislation in
Canadian history-an omnibus amendment to the criminal code that included
provisions to sanction the sale of contraceptives, legalize abortion, and
condone anal intercourse between consenting adults in private. Let us, though,
not pin all the blame on Trudeau. Upon final passage in 1969, his bill was
supported by his fellow Liberals, the New Democrats, and 12 Progressive
Conservatives, including party leader Robert Stanfield.
Charter
of Rights
Twelve
years later, Parliament and the provincial legislatures embraced another, even
more disastrous, Trudeau-inspired reform-the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. The Charter is a truly Orwellian document: it means the opposite from
what it says. Under the pretence of upholding the Charter, the Supreme Court of
Canada has undermined the historic rights and freedoms of Canadians, usurped the
legislative authority of elected representatives of the people, and subverted
the rule of law.
Alberta:
the Vriend rulings
Consider
the arrogant decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Vriend v. Alberta, 1998
SCC. The appellant in this case, Delwyn Vriend, was fired from his post as a
laboratory co-ordinator at King's University College, an Evangelical Protestant
institution in Edmonton, for openly flouting a college rule forbidding the
practice of homosexuality. He appealed to the Alberta Human Rights Commission,
complaining that the College had unlawfully discriminated against him on the
ground of sexual orientation. The Commission held that it had no lawful basis to
proceed with the complaint, because sexual orientation was not a prohibited
ground for discrimination in the Alberta human rights code.
Prior
to the Charter, the courts were bound to uphold the plain meaning of the law.
Today, that is no longer the case. With backing from "gay rights"
activists, Vriend appealed to the courts, claiming the exclusion of sexual
orientation from the Alberta human rights code violated the guarantee of
equality rights for homosexuals in section 15 of the Charter. To the amazement
and consternation of many Albertans, Madam Justice A. H. Russell of the Court of
Queen's Bench not only agreed with this argument, but also unilaterally changed
the law, by amending the Alberta human rights code to include sexual orientation
as a prohibited ground for discrimination.
The
matter proceeded to the Alberta Court of Appeal, which reversed Russell's
judgment, albeit in only a two-to-one ruling. Writing for the majority, Mr.
Justice John McClung upheld the traditional principles of parliamentary
supremacy. In his view, an unelected judge should not presume to second guess
the wisdom of laws enacted by elected representatives of the people.
"Whatever the private concerns of the reviewing judge," he wrote,
"that judge is duty bound to uphold the law." McClung noted that
"the vast majority of Canadians obey the laws that are imposed upon them by
their chosen representatives. In short, they keep to the statutes and they are
entitled to expect that their judges will do so too. They do not want their
judges to redesign them when those statutes are written in perfectly
understandable words of daily French or English usage."
McClung's
pointed and well-chosen remarks did not sit well with the Supreme Court of
Canada. In a ruling on 2 April 1998, the country's top court sided with Russell,
by citing an alleged guarantee of equality rights for homosexuals in section 15
of the Charter as a pretence for amending the Alberta human rights code to
include sexual orientation as a prohibited ground for discrimination. This
decision was wholly illegitimate. There is no mention of sexual orientation in
section 15 or any other section of the Charter. Moreover, this omission, like
the omission of sexual orientation from the Alberta human rights code, was
deliberate. During clause-by-clause consideration of the Charter by a Special
Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons on the Constitution of
Canada, New Democrat MP Svend Robinson proposed an amendment to include sexual
orientation in section 15. The committee decisively repudiated the motion by a
vote of 22 to two.
Sexual
orientation: the Egan case, 1995
Has
the Supreme Court of Canada paid any heed to this clear parliamentary
declaration? Not at all. In Egan v. Canada, 1995, the Court decreed that sexual
orientation is analogous to race, colour, religion and other grounds explicitly
included in section 15. And on the basis of this distortion of the law, the
Court presumed in Vriend to write sexual orientation into the Alberta human
rights code.
The
Egan decision is also noteworthy, inasmuch as it is a tangle of contradictions,
affirming the fundamental importance of marriage and the natural family while
imposing equality rights for homosexuals. At issue in this case was the claim by
the appellants, James Egan, a longstanding gay rights activist, and his partner,
John Norris Nesbit, that the exclusion of same-sex partners from spousal
benefits under the Old Age Security Act violated the equality rights of
homosexuals.
While
agreeing that such rights are implicit in section 15 of the Charter, a majority
of the Supreme Court held that the definition of spouse in the Old Age Security
Act is nonetheless consistent with the Charter. In support of this view, Mr.
Justice Gerald La Forest maintained in his reasons for judgment in Egan that
marriage is essential to the nurturing of children.
Furthermore,
he said, "many of the underlying concerns that justify Parliament's support
and protection of legal marriage extend to heterosexual couples who are not
legally married. Many of these couples live together indefinitely, bring forth
children and care for them in response to familial instincts rooted in the human
psyche. These couples have need for support just as legally married couples do
in performing this critical task, which is of benefit to all society. Language
has long captured the essence of this relationship by the expression 'common-law
marriage.'" In conclusion, La Forest held that "homosexual couples are
not, therefore, discriminated against," because Parliament had good reason
to confine spousal benefits under the Old Age Security Act to married and
common-law couples.
M
v H case, 1999
Four
years after Egan, the Supreme Court of Canada dealt with a similar issue in M.
v. H., a case that arose out of an acrimonious dispute between an estranged
lesbian couple. After M. moved out of their common home, she sued H. for spousal
support pursuant to the Ontario Family Law Act, although section 29 of the Act
stipulated that the support provisions in the law applied only to married and
common-law spouses. Backed by the Ontario Human Rights Commission, M. argued
such a restrictive definition of spouse
violated
the rights of lesbians to equality under the Charter.
It
happened that the Ontario Legislature had debated this issue at length in 1994,
when the New Democratic Party government of former premier Bob Rae introduced an
omnibus bill to redefine the definition of spouse in Ontario law so that support
benefits, adoption rights, and other entitlements would be extended to
homosexual couples on the same basis as heterosexual couples. The bill touched
off a storm of public protest so intense that it provoked a backbench revolt
within the NDP caucus and prompted the Liberals to oppose the bill, although
party leader Lyn McLeod had written a letter to Rae just a few months earlier,
demanding to know why he had not changed the laws of the province to accommodate
"gay rights". In the end, enough dissenting New Democrats joined with
the Liberals and the Progressive Conservatives to defeat the radical measure.
Did
the Supreme Court of Canada respect the express wishes of the Ontario
Legislature in M. v. H.? Did the Court follow its own reasoning in Egan? Not at
all. The Court abruptly reversed course, by holding that the exclusion of
same-sex couples from section 29 of the Family Law Act cannot be demonstrably
justified as a reasonable limit on the equality rights of homosexuals. However,
instead of unilaterally changing the law as in Vriend, Mr. Justice Frank
Iacobucci warned in his reasons for judgment in M. v. H. that the Court would
declare section 29 of the Family Law Act of no force or effect, unless the
Ontario Legislature came up with a satisfactory amendment within six months.
Harris
caves in
In
response to this judicial blackmail, the Harris government might have done
nothing. In that event, section 29 of the Family Law Act would have lapsed after
the six-months deadline with the result that only married couples would be
entitled to support benefits under the Act. And that would have been all to the
good. It was a tragic mistake in the 1970s to start extending spousal benefits
to couples in common-law unions that are far more fragile than marriages,
despite the epidemic of divorce over the past 40 years. If only out of regard
for the health and safety of children and youth, federal and provincial
legislators should encourage stable marriages, by reverting to the confinement
of spousal benefits to married couples.
What,
though, did the Harris government do in reaction to the Supreme Court of
Canada's judgment in M. v. H.? It caved in. The Harris Conservatives introduced
into the Legislature an omnibus gay rights bill of its own that included
amendments not just to the Family Law Act, but also to 66 other Ontario
statutes. Despite having emphatically repudiated the Rae government's similar
"gay rights" legislation in 1994, the Ontario Liberal Party under its
new leader Dalton McGuinty hailed this new Progressive Conservative "gay
rights" bill as "historic." Likewise, Ontario New Democratic
leader Howard Hampton described the legislation as "very important."
And how long did the Legislature take to ponder this enormously complex,
portentous, "historic," and "very important" bill? Fewer
than three hours. In one of the most bizarre actions in the history of
parliamentary government, all three parties in the Ontario Legislature imposed a
radical "gay rights" law on the people of Ontario with no democratic
debate.
Premier
Ralph Klein In Alberta, the government of
Premier Ralph Klein has also abjectly capitulated to the determination of the
Supreme Court of Canada to impose its "gay rights" agenda on the
country. Following the Court's Vriend decision, Stockwell Day, Jason Kenney, and
a number of other pro-family politicians and activists urged Klein to seek a
mandate from the people of Alberta in a referendum for invoking the
notwithstanding clause of the Constitution to shelter the Alberta human rights
code from judicial interference. Klein refused to do so. At least, though, he
promised to build legal "fences" around the Vriend ruling so it would
not affect family law and marital status. Alas, that promise soon proved
worthless.
In
response to a lawsuit brought by two lesbian couples, the Klein government
rushed a bill through the Alberta Legislature on 13 May 1999, amending the
province's Child Welfare Act to permit gay couples to adopt children. A few days
later, Klein bowed to the ruling of the Supreme Court of Canada in M. v. H.
Every other provincial premier, government, and legislature has done the same.
With more or less enthusiasm, they have all acquiesced in the dictatorial
imposition of "gay rights" by our supreme judicial masters in the
Supreme Court of Canada.
There
is but one exception. On 23 February 2000, Victor Doerksen, a Conservative
backbencher in the Alberta Legislature, introduced a private member's bill that
not only defined marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman, but also
invoked the notwithstanding clause of the Charter to shelter the law from
interference by gay activists in the courts. This bill- the first in Canada
specifying that marriage is exclusively a union of a man and a woman-was passed
by the Legislature in a free vote on 15 March 2000. Klein was discreetly absent
for the vote. His Justice Minister Dave Hancock stood up against the
legislation, after explaining that he believed the notwithstanding clause of the
Charter should only be invoked "when it's absolutely necessary for the
better functioning of society."
British
Columbia
Meanwhile,
across Canada, courts and human rights commissions have grown ever bolder in
their determination to impose special rights for gays and lesbians. In 1998,
Madam Justice Mary Saunders of the British Columbia Supreme Court set an ominous
precedent, by striking down a resolution adopted by the district school board
for Surrey, British Columbia, which declared that three books depicting children
with same-sex parents-Asha's Mums; Belinda's Bouquet; and One Two Dads, Brown
Dad, Blue Dads-were not suitable for use as recommended learning resources for
students in kindergarten and Grade 1.
Saunders
ruled that the resolution violated the equality rights of homosexuals in the
Charter. In addition, she held that the school board must uphold the secular
nature of the public schools, by precluding any "decision significantly
influenced by religious considerations." In effect, she barred all
theologically orthodox Christians and Jews from serving on a public school
board. While this outrageous ruling was overturned on appeal, that's hardly
reassuring. Saunders is an up-and-coming judge. In 1999, Prime Minister Jean
Chretien and Justice Minister Anne McLennan secured her promotion to the British
Columbia Court of Appeal, where she is better placed to advance her radical
"gay rights" and secular agenda.
Across
Canada: Religious freedom at stake
Even
now, conscientious Christians and Jews should beware. Anyone can run afoul of
human rights tribunals and the courts, simply by professing in public the
traditional teaching of Judeo-Christian morality on the sinfulness of homosexual
relations. Hugh Owens understands this point all too well: on June 15, he was
told by the Saskatchewan Human Rights Board of Inquiry that he had violated the
equality rights of three gay men by expressing his opinion on gay and lesbian
sex through an advertisement in the Saskatoon Star Phoenix that consisted solely
of a pictograph of two men holding hands superimposed with a circle and
slash-the symbol of something forbidden- and a list of Bible verses condemning
the practice of homosexuality. For this offence, the Board directed Owens to pay
the complainants $1,500 each in damages. He is appealing the ruling to the
courts. If he loses and still refuses to comply with the directive of the Board
of Inquiry, he could be charged with contempt of court, convicted and consigned
to jail as a Christian prisoner of conscience.
The
same fate threatens Scott Brockie, the conscientious owner of a Toronto print
shop who has been ordered by an Ontario Human Rights Board of Inquiry to pay
$5,000 in damages to Ray Brillinger, a gay rights activist, for refusing
Brillinger's request to print materials for the Canadian Lesbian and Gay
Archives. Heather MacNaughton, the adjudicator assigned to this case,
acknowledged in her ruling on 24 February 2000 that Brockie is a sincere
born-again Christian who had printed materials for businesses operated by
homosexual customers, but could not in good conscience do the same for an
organization whose stated aim is to "help lesbian and gay men live free,
proud and positive lives." She held that Brockie could not lawfully
discriminate against the Archives, because equality rights for homosexuals trump
the rights of Christians to freedom of religion in the provision or withholding
of a public service. By this reasoning, she concluded that Brockie was obligated
by the Ontario human rights code and the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to print
materials for the Lesbian and Gay Alliance, despite his religious convictions on
the sinfulness of homosexual behaviour.
Yet
MacNaughton insisted: "In fact nothing in my order will prevent Brockie
from continuing to hold and practise his religious beliefs. Brockie remains free
to hold his religious beliefs and to practise them in his home, and in his
Christian community....What he is not free to do, when he enters the public
marketplace and offers services to the public in Ontario, is to practise those
beliefs in a manner that discriminates against lesbians and gays by denying them
a service available to everyone else."
Like
Owens, Brockie is appealing the ruling. The Canadian Religious Freedom Alliance,
an association of the Christian Legal Fellowship, The Evangelical Fellowship of
Canada, and The Catholic Civil Rights League have intervened on Brockie's
behalf. In a factum prepared for the Alliance, David M. Brown maintains that
MacNaughton's distinction between "'public right, but private practice'
does not accord with the jurisprudence of the courts on the scope of freedom of
religion."
As
authority, Brown cited a ruling by the Supreme Court of Canada on May 17, 2001,
that upheld the rights of graduates of Trinity Western University (TWU) to teach
in the public schools of British Columbia, despite their religious objections to
the practice of homosexuality (see "Assault on freedom of religion"
C.I., Sept. 2001, pp. 30-32). The Court acknowledged, "The public dimension
of religious freedom and the right to determine one's moral conduct have been
recognized long before the advent of the Charter."
However,
the Court also warned in its TWU judgment that "the proper place to draw
the line in cases like the one at bar is generally between belief and conduct.
The freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them. Absent
concrete evidence that training teachers at TWU fosters discrimination in the
public schools of B.C., the freedom of individuals to adhere to certain
religious beliefs while at TWU should be respected."
What
does the Court's distinction between belief and conduct entail? In a commentary
in the Globe and Mail on 31 May 2001, Ian Hunter, a professor emeritus at the
University of Western Ontario law school, suggested,
"In
essence, the Supreme Court has ruled that there is a right to believe what you
want as long as you never communicate those beliefs or attempt to put them into
practice. Trinity Western ought not to be celebrating such a Lilliputian view of
religious freedom.
"If
I may paraphrase the university's victory in words that might still have a
certain resonance among its own faculty and students: You are free to be hearers
of The Word but not doers; you may render unto God when on campus but only to
Caesar off campus. By their deeds no one shall know them."
Like
Brown, Brockie's lawyer, Iain Benson, the executive director of the Centre for
Cultural Renewal, takes a more optimistic view of the Court's ruling in TWU.
Which of these distinguished lawyers is right-Brown, Benson or Hunter? That's
impossible to say, because judicial activists on the Supreme Court of Canada no
longer abide by the precedents set by their own Court. Recall the glaring
inconsistency between M. v. H. and Egan. In the former, the Court ruled the
denial of support benefits to same-sex couples in the Ontario Family Law Act was
unconstitutional, despite its holding just four years earlier in Egan that the
denial of pension benefits to same-sex couples in the Old Age Security Act is
entirely consistent with the Charter.
Peter
McCormick, a professor of political science at the University of Lethbridge, is
a Charter enthusiast, yet he concedes in his book Supreme At Last: The Evolution
of the Supreme Court of Canada that there was no legal basis for the sudden
turnaround between Egan and M. v. H. He writes:
"It
was less that the two situations were massively different (indeed, La Forest's
rhetoric on the family probably fits better with M. v. H.) than that the
personnel (of the Supreme Court of Canada) had changed and the Court's centre of
gravity had changed with it."
Given
such rapid evolution of doctrine, legislators must feel that they are shooting
at hidden targets without knowing if the targets have been moved since the last
time the lights were on. Even if you approve the Court's ruling in any
individual case, this mutability might make you a little nervous. If you
disapprove, it tends to make you angry.
Yet
most Canadians are complacent. They think they are safe, because they have
conformed their thinking to the corrupt pattern of court-defined human rights
that contradicts more than 2,000 years of Judeo-Christian teaching. That's a
dangerous delusion. While purporting to uphold the Charter, the Supreme Court of
Canada has subverted the entire rule of law.
The
disposition of our robed dictators to change the law to suit their ideological
preferences does not just threaten Brockie and Owens, but undermines the genuine
human rights and fundamental freedoms of every citizen. Canadians had better
quickly awaken to the peril, because John Philpot Curran was surely right:
"The condition upon which God hath given liberty to man is eternal
vigilance; which condition if he break, servitude is at once the consequence of
his crime, and the punishment of his guilt."
Rory
Leishman, 836 Wellington St., London, ON, N6A 3S7. Home/Office Phone:
519-439-2676, Home Page: http://members.home.net/rleishman